World

Is the Strait of Hormuz the key to resolving the crisis?

Iran’s response to the American closure of the Strait of Hormuz, among other actions, was not arbitrary. Rather, it was a calculated reaction directed at US interests. A brief examination of the Strait of Hormuz’s importance to the United States, in particular, and its policy of containing the escalation with the Houthis in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb at the end of 2023, helps to understand the recent developments in the region’s crisis. Although the Strait was not among the points of contention between the United States and Iran before the war, it has now become a priority, especially after the US imposed a blockade on Iranian ships and ports surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and demanded, during direct negotiations between the two countries in Islamabad, that Iran cease its threats related to the Strait. 

The Strait of Hormuz is considered the world’s most important maritime energy chokepoint, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Approximately 20% of the world’s daily oil consumption and a third of its liquefied natural gas trade pass through it. Located within the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman, the strait is subject to the “Transit Passage” system, as it is considered an international waterway under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This convention prohibits the imposition of transit fees, Iran has threatened to levy, and which the International Maritime Organization has deemed a dangerous precedent.

The United States plays a crucial role in securing maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Through the Fifth Fleet, whose stated mission is “protecting freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz,” the United States protects ships, escorts oil tankers when necessary, and deters threats. The United States thus controls the Strait through its significant military capabilities deployed in and around the region, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, missile defence systems, and reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, even under normal circumstances, i.e., before any crisis occurs.

The United States also maintains an air presence in the Gulf, based at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which includes a diverse fleet of reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft as well as fighter jets (F-15, F-16, F-35). Furthermore, it possesses missile defence systems such as Patriot and THAAD, deployed in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. In addition, the United States maintains tens of thousands of ground troops in the region, though this number fluctuates depending on regional developments. These forces are stationed at bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE.

This strategic and comprehensive military presence in the region was developed gradually. Historically, it began after the British withdrawal from the region, relying on its allies, without the need to deploy a large number of American troops. However, the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 marked the beginning of a real American military presence, practically embodied in President Jimmy Carter’s announcement of his national security doctrine in 1980.

The Carter Doctrine stipulated that any attempt to control the Gulf would be considered a threat to vital American interests and would be met with force. Based on these developments, the US Rapid Deployment Force was established in the region during that period.

The second development came during the First Gulf War between 1990 and 1991, when the United States began deploying a massive American military force and building military bases in the region, including the Fifth Fleet. The activation of the naval military system in 1995 translated into a permanent American military presence, including naval command and a continuous presence in the Strait of Hormuz. The next qualitative shift in the American military presence in the region came after the war on Iraq in 2003, as the American system became fully integrated in a way that controlled all security, military, naval, air and land levels.

READ: Iran has ‘high’ incentive to maintain ceasefire, US forces remain ‘postured’: US defense chief

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) considers the Strait of Hormuz one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints. The Gulf region, and the area between the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, is of paramount importance to Washington. This region supplies a significant portion of the world’s oil, making its stability essential to the stability of the global economy, which is led by Washington. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates that Gulf sovereign wealth funds are among the world’s largest investors and have a direct impact on international financial markets, particularly the US market. According to the US Federal Reserve, foreign investors, especially those from the Gulf states, play a significant role in the US Treasury bond market. The Gulf also represents one of the world’s largest markets for US arms, making it a major source of revenue for Washington. Therefore, protecting the economies of the Gulf states is a central objective for Washington. Washington is also concerned with protecting the interests of its allies in Europe, Japan, Korea, and India in Asia, who are economically dependent on this region in general, and the Strait of Hormuz in particular. The US military presence in the region also provides a strong deterrent against Iran, primarily serving the interests of its Israeli ally. Therefore, US protection of the Strait of Hormuz contributes to safeguarding the global economic order and achieving global maritime dominance, an order primarily led by the United States.

This comes within the framework of carefully considered, pragmatic American calculations that balance its deep strategic alliance with Israel with maintaining its vital economic partnership with the Gulf states, and ensuring the stability of navigation in the Gulf region, that is, ensuring stability between the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz Straits, which is intrinsically linked to the previous point. This delicate and dangerous equation forms the basis of Iran’s strategy for responding to the American-Israeli attack against it.

Iran responded to the recent US-Israeli move by adopting a “maritime denial” strategy in the Strait of Hormuz, aiming to disrupt passage by increasing its cost. Given its proximity to Iran and the military preparations surrounding it, this strategy exploits the Strait’s strategic value as a chokepoint, rendering it highly vulnerable to disruption. During the war, Iran successfully prevented hostile forces from entering the Strait of Hormuz and significantly reduced their freedom of movement within it.

By virtue of its geographical location, Iran maintains direct control over the northern coast of the Strait.

Under normal circumstances, it secures its position and interests in the region through a military presence on strategic islands such as Hormuz, Qeshm, Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunb, as well as the unconventional naval capabilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), supported by fast attack craft, sea mines, and coastal anti-ship missiles.

Iran’s strategy of prevention and denial, adopted after the American and Israeli war on it, by making the Strait of Hormuz unusable through raising the level of the risk, came with the aim of challenging the United States specifically, because it was the de facto controller of the strait before the war, under the pretext of protecting it. Thus, Iran opened an open review with the United States after the war, using the resulting economic pressure as one of the means of confronting the aggression against it.

READ: Iran supreme leader’s adviser threatens to sink US ships in Strait of Hormuz

Five days after the ceasefire between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other went into effect on the 8th of this month, the United States imposed a naval blockade on access to Iranian ports and coastal areas in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea. The implementation of the American plan remains complex. Although the narrowness of the strait geographically facilitates the blockade, and the plan’s success hinges on enforcing compliance from transiting vessels, a relatively straightforward task, Iran can continue its threats to target specific ships, which would prevent them from passing through, even with American permission. However, this option is not without cost for Iran. The United States has announced that it will immediately target any Iranian attack craft that approaches the blockade’s enforcement.

The dilemma lies in the fact that the United States, through this blockade plan, aims to immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic in order to salvage the global economy. In other words, time is the key factor in this plan, and Iran has considerable influence over it.

It is difficult for Iran to ignore the United States’ experience in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in late 2023. The Strait, through which approximately 10–12 percent of global trade and a significant amount of oil and gas pass, is also considered a bottleneck affecting the global order, a sensitive strategic point where security, the economy, and energy intersect. The Houthis in Yemen began targeting ships in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, aiming to pressure Israel over the Gaza war, which disrupted one of the world’s most important maritime routes, forcing ships to divert to the longer and more expensive Cape of Good Hope route. Initially, Washington launched a maritime coalition to protect shipping and carried out limited military strikes against Houthi positions. However, it subsequently avoided a full-scale war in Yemen, opting instead for de-escalation and crisis management to protect global trade. This is in contrast with the Israeli position, which favored a more aggressive confrontation.

These developments explain the inclusion of a clause concerning freedom of movement and security in the Strait of Hormuz among the outstanding issues in the ongoing bilateral negotiations in Islamabad, following the two-week ceasefire that is nearing its end. Despite the US blockade of Iranian ships and ports, and its economic impact on Iran as a means of exerting pressure, Iran retains the capability to disrupt maritime traffic, not only in the Strait of Hormuz but also in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a fact well understood by the United States. Therefore, the ceasefire appears to be merely a prelude to an understanding that Washington considers crucial. Talk of entering a second round of negotiations to bridge the differences, particularly regarding the timeframe permitted for Iran’s uranium enrichment, is indicative of this. This comes in light of previous understandings reached by both sides before Washington’s recent attack on Iran, which addressed the enrichment level, the transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, and a prior Iranian commitment not to weaponise its nuclear program. While the prevailing impression now following the cease fire, and the desire to continue negotiations, is to avoid a resumption of hostilities. The possibility of renewed fighting between Iran and the United States remains, an option thought not wanted by both sides. This is Israel may the only party that favors war and is pushing for, while domestic American and international opposition to a return to war, which has created worsening economic crises for many countries around the world, is growing.

OPINION: Does diplomacy through the use of military force always succeed?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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