“The favorite is whoever is not in power, not whoever is on the right,” Andrés Malamud, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, told The Media Line as he explained the new political map in Latin America.
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Javier Milei’s victory in Argentina, José Antonio Kast’s rise in Chile, Abelardo De La Espriella’s win in Colombia, and Keiko Fujimori’s return to power in Peru may look like a conservative sweep, but Malamud said the numbers point to something more unstable: electorates turning against incumbents and punishing governments that failed to deliver on security, inflation, corruption, and basic order.
“What is happening in Latin America in this decade is a shift toward the opposition more than a shift toward the right,” he said.
That distinction matters more now that the right has gained ground across the region.
Argentina opened the cycle in November 2023 with Milei, a libertarian outsider who turned anger at the political class into a presidency. Chile followed with Kast, who took office in March 2026 after a campaign centered on crime, immigration, and fiscal discipline. Colombia turned against Gustavo Petro and elected De La Espriella, a hardline right-wing political newcomer. Peru has returned the Fujimorismo movement to the presidency after years of instability and repeated failed bids by Fujimori.
Still, the map has not turned all at once. Brazil and Mexico, Latin America’s two largest countries, remain under left-wing governments. Uruguay returned the Frente Amplio to power in 2024. In Brazil, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is still polling ahead of Senator Flávio Bolsonaro ahead of an October election that could either confirm the regional swing or expose its limits.
That is why analysts are cautious about treating the moment as a confirmed ideological realignment. The right is winning more often, but not everywhere, and not always by much.
What has spread faster than ideology is impatience.
Malamud said the change is visible but should be measured carefully. In the first decade of this century, he said, left-wing candidates won roughly 60% of presidential races in Latin America. In the following decade, they won about 55%. In the current decade, that share has fallen to around 40%, meaning the right is now winning more often than before. But he said the stronger pattern is alternation. Opposition candidates, he said, now win about 75% of elections. “The right wins 60% in this decade, the oppositions win 75%,” he said. “That means the favorite is the one who is not in power.”
Nuance matters, it’s not just a ‘shift to the right’ but a shift to the opposition
That interpretation matters, according to Malamud, because several of the victories, such as Colombia and Peru, were decided by narrow margins.
He explained that describing the current moment as a simple tide to the right risks underestimating both the parity in public opinion and the intensity of polarization. In his view, Latin America is not only moving right, it is also moving against those in power.
The new right is far from homogeneous. Milei represents an economic and libertarian revolt in Argentina. Bukele’s El Salvador is built around a security-first model. Kast’s Chile is more conservative and institutional. De La Espriella’s Colombia combines law-and-order politics, deregulation, and open sympathy for US President Donald Trump. Fujimori inherits a family brand associated with security, market policies, authoritarian memories, and Peru’s long institutional crisis. Malamud said the leaders share a language of rejection more than a common governing program, often opposing what they describe broadly as communism, globalism, socialism, and feminism.
Christian Pino, a Chilean journalist with a master’s degree in international relations, security, and defense from Chile’s National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies, ANEPE, sees the same movement through Chile’s history of political pendulums.
Chile, he said, has spent two decades alternating between left and right: Michelle Bachelet, Sebastián Piñera, Bachelet again, Piñera again, Gabriel Boric, and now Kast. Similar patterns have appeared elsewhere, from Argentina’s movement between Kirchnerism, Mauricio Macri, and Milei to Brazil’s shift from Jair Bolsonaro to Lula.
But Pino said the pendulum is now “being dyed with more conservative ideas,” mainly because voters are demanding order. In Chile and other countries, he argued, irregular immigration, organized crime, and new forms of violence have changed the political conversation. “
Mainly, I understand it, because of the demand for order that irregular immigration has brought in several countries,” he said, comparing the appeal in some places to the Bukele model–the punitive public security strategy championed by El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele.
Security is the clearest common denominator among many of the region’s new right-wing campaigns, even when their economic programs differ. Malamud said Kast, Fujimori, De La Espriella, and Bukele all respond to insecurity as a leading public demand.
Milei is different because Argentina’s crisis was above all economic. Bolsonaro’s original rise, Malamud added, was driven more by anti-PT (Brazil’s Workers’ Party) anger and corruption than by crime, even though insecurity has long been a major issue in Brazil.
Don’t jump to conclusions
Prof. Arie Kacowicz, professor of international relations and the Chaim Weizmann Chair in International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, also cautioned against making hasty conclusions.
“It is not one explanation,” he told The Media Line. Some observers see the shift as part of the “effect” of Trump’s return to power, he said, as if Latin American countries were rushing to align themselves with Washington. Kacowicz said that may be part of the background, but he does not see it as the core reason voters are moving to the right. The deeper issue, he said, is whether citizens believe governments “deliver or do not deliver.”
For Kacowicz, Latin America’s ability to punish incumbents is one of the region’s most important political drivers. When voters conclude that the economy is not improving, corruption remains high, or crime is out of control, governments are replaced.
That, he said, helps explain Colombia, Peru, and Chile without reducing them to a single ideological story. He described the present moment as a “grey tide,” a conservative counterpart to the earlier “pink tide,” but emphasized that voters usually prioritize their daily lives. The average Latin American voter, he said, is less focused on Iran, Hezbollah, Israel, or the Middle East than on whether he can walk in the street without being robbed.
Immigration, especially from Venezuela, has sharpened that domestic debate. Malamud said Venezuelan immigration matters most in the Andean countries and in Chile, where it has become a central political rather than social issue. In Argentina and Uruguay, he said, many Venezuelan migrants arrived as professionals and did not create the same political reaction. In Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, by contrast, immigration from Venezuela became closely tied to debates over public security, state capacity, and national identity.
Pino described the Venezuelan crisis as a regional shock that altered Chile’s sense of distance from the rest of Latin America. Chile, he said, had long seen itself as geographically protected by the desert in the north, the Andes to the east, Antarctica to the south, and the Pacific Ocean to the west.
The arrival of new criminal networks and high-impact crimes changed that self-image. Kast’s promise of “order and justice,” Pino said, created high expectations that will be difficult to satisfy quickly. He said Brazil could yet experience a similar political dynamic if crime and public frustration dominate the campaign.
If security explains much of the vote, geopolitics explains why the shift matters outside Latin America. The new right tends to speak more naturally to Washington, more warmly about Israel, and more suspiciously about China, Russia, and Iran. But the distance between campaign language and state policy remains wide.
Trump’s administration has placed Latin America inside a broader contest over influence, infrastructure, communications, and strategic alignment. Yet even governments that admire the US president cannot easily detach from Beijing, which is now central to trade, investment, and infrastructure across much of South America.
Malamud said Washington’s concern over China goes beyond President Trump and reflects a broader anti-Chinese consensus in the US political elite. That consensus, he said, has produced red lines for allies, especially in communications technology, including Huawei’s 5G and 6G technology, and in sensitive infrastructure such as deep-water ports or space observation facilities with military uses. Sometimes Washington manages to shape or block projects before they advance; sometimes it arrives late.
Misconception of coordination between Latin America’s China, Russia, Iran blocs
He rejected the idea that China, Russia, and Iran operate as a disciplined bloc in Latin America. Washington may group them together, he said, but in practice, their coordination is limited. China pursues business. Russia pursues its own interests. Iran seeks influence, but neither Russia nor China intervened directly when Iran was under attack. Right-wing Latin American leaders may be inclined to accept Washington’s framing, but trade creates hard limits. Bolsonaro and Milei both spoke about reducing business with China, Malamud said, yet neither could break from Beijing because China was too important commercially.
Brazil illustrates that constraint. During Bolsonaro’s presidency, Malamud said, the government’s rhetoric leaned strongly toward the West, but the military establishment maintained ties with China. Former Vice President Hamilton Mourão, himself a military figure, helped preserve the relationship when Bolsonaro neglected it. For Malamud, that example shows why ideology does not automatically overcome trade, institutions, or geography.
Chile faces a similar tension. Pino said China, Russia, and Iran have expanded their influence in Latin America, with China especially visible in Argentina and Chile. He cited the debate over a Chile-China communications cable as an example of the pressure on Santiago. Chile, he said, is “caught in the middle”: a small country of 20 million people dealing with a power the size of China. In his view, Kast’s government is trying to repair what he described as a damaged foreign policy under Boric, especially toward Israel and in areas connected to defense and commerce.
Relations with Israel are changing in this region
Israel is where the ideological shift becomes most visible, even if it is not decisive for voters. Under Milei, Argentina has built an unusually close relationship with Jerusalem. Chile, after years of diplomatic friction under Boric, is moving toward a reconstruction of ties. Colombia, after Petro broke relations with Israel, is expected to restore them under De La Espriella. Brazil remains the larger unresolved case: relations under Lula have been deeply strained but not formally severed.
Kacowicz said Israel often views Latin American elections through a narrow prism, whether a candidate is pro-Israel or anti-Israel. Colombia is the clearest case, because Petro broke relations, and a new government is expected to reopen diplomatic channels. Kacowicz noted that Colombia has historically been a close Israeli partner in security and also sells coal to Israel. Brazil, he said, is more important strategically and more complicated. Lula, he said, is not antisemitic, but made “very, very extreme” statements about Israel’s actions in Gaza, including comparisons to the Nazis.
Still, Kacowicz warned that pro-Israel rhetoric does not translate equally across the region. Argentina has gone further than most under Milei, moving its embassy to Jerusalem and deepening ties with Israel. Brazil remains more complicated because of its relations with Arab countries, China, and Iran, and because its diplomatic tradition has generally resisted abrupt breaks. That creates limits even for governments that are friendlier to Israel.
“It is complicated,” he said. Even so, he added, Israel can benefit from the rightward shift if diplomatic relations improve in Chile, Colombia, and, depending on Brazil’s election, Brasília.
Malamud was more direct in describing Israel as an ideological marker. In today’s Latin America, he said, left-wing governments tend to be suspicious of Israel’s government, while right-wing governments tend to support it. But he also stressed that this matters far more to political elites than to the general electorate. Presidents can take strong positions on Israel because the electoral cost is usually low. Latin American voters, he said, mostly vote on security, the economy, and immigration. Israel sits much lower on the public agenda.
In Chile, Pino said the issue is especially sensitive because of the country’s large Palestinian community and much smaller Jewish community. Public support for Israel, he said, carries social and political costs.
But he also argued that the Middle East remains distant for most Chileans, beyond activists and communities directly engaged in the issue. Chile lost citizens on October 7, 2023, but Pino said the country never fully told their stories or made the attack part of a national conversation. For most voters, he said, crime, wages, and immigration remain far closer to home.
That is why Brazil now stands at the center of the next stage. If the right wins in October, the ideological map of South America will look dramatically different. If Lula survives, the region remains divided, and the idea of a consolidated conservative wave becomes harder to sustain.
Kacowicz called Brazil the most interesting case for both Latin America and Israel, not only because of its size but because its runoff system makes alliances decisive.
In Malamud’s opinion, even a Bolsonaro victory would not automatically create a coherent conservative bloc. Ideological affinity, he said, has rarely produced durable regional institutions in Latin America. The left-wing cycle of the early 2000s brought leaders such as Lula, Néstor Kirchner, and Hugo Chávez into office at the same time, yet it left few lasting structures. “There is no pipeline that goes from Caracas to Buenos Aires,” he said. A new right-wing wave could generate enthusiasm and summitry, but economic integration would remain limited because the region’s main commercial partners are outside Latin America. Security coordination would also face obstacles because right-wing leaders tend to be strongly sovereigntist.
The paradox of the Latin American right-wing movement
That leaves Latin America in a paradox. The region is moving right, but it is not necessarily building a conservative international order. Its leaders may speak more favorably about President Trump, more warmly about Israel, and more suspiciously about China, Russia, and Iran. But they govern divided societies, unstable congresses, crime-ridden borders, and economies tied to Chinese demand, US pressure, and local hardship. Their voters want immediate order, not geopolitical doctrine.
For now, the balance has changed enough to be of note. Argentina has moved openly toward Washington and Jerusalem. Chile is repairing ties with Israel and drawing closer to regional conservatives. Colombia is preparing to reverse Petro’s rupture with Israel. Peru is returning “Fujimorismo” to the presidency. Ecuador, Panama, and others have added to the broader rightward trend. But Mexico remains with Morena, Brazil remains under Lula, Uruguay has returned to the center-left, and the new conservative governments still have to prove they can govern after winning on public anger.
For Israel, the change is already visible. A region that recently included several governments openly hostile to Jerusalem now offers the possibility of restored diplomatic channels, renewed security cooperation, and a more receptive political climate in Santiago, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and, depending on Brazil, Brasília. For Washington, the same movement creates an opening to rebuild influence in a hemisphere where China has become too economically important to ignore.
But the rightward turn will not erase the other powers already embedded in Latin America. China will remain a buyer, lender, and infrastructure partner. Russia and Iran will continue to look for political, media, and diplomatic space. Even governments that feel ideologically close to Trump or to Israel will face the constraint Malamud described: campaign language can move faster than trade, institutions, or geography. The new political map should therefore be read as an opening, not a reversal of the regional order.
