Modern technology and contemporary wars: A reading of the “digital conflict and competition environment” and intelligence work

General context

Modern technology today is no longer merely a set of tools for communication or information processing; rather, it has become an integrated environment within which states, societies, institutions, and contemporary conflicts operate. With the major expansion of artificial intelligence, digital platforms, satellites, drones, and cyber infrastructures, the world now exists within a “digital conflict and competition environment” in which information, influence, communication, perception, and political and security decision-making overlap in unprecedented ways.

Within this environment, wars and conflicts are no longer managed solely through traditional military confrontations, but are increasingly conducted simultaneously within cyberspace, the information domain, and arenas of media and cognitive influence. Data — along with its analysis and interconnection — as well as the ability to manage narratives and shape public opinion, have become essential components in building modern power and managing conflict. Superiority is therefore no longer linked only to the size of military force, but also to the ability to understand, manage, and influence the information environment.

From this perspective, this discussion seeks to provide a simplified analytical reading of how digital transformations and artificial intelligence are affecting the nature of intelligence work, modern warfare, and national security, while linking this to examples related to Gaza, Sudan, and the broader regional environment, within an increasingly complex context in which states and societies operate inside a “digital conflict and competition environment,” where military power, informational influence, cyberspace, and societal perception intersect in shaping the nature and outcomes of contemporary conflicts.

How has modern technology changed the nature of intelligence work in the Middle East?

The nature of the conflict environment

Modern technology, and the emergence of what may be described as a “digital conflict and competition environment,” have transformed intelligence work from relying on the collection of fragmented information into managing a comprehensive and interconnected information environment. Intelligence today no longer depends solely on traditional sources; instead, it increasingly relies on big data analytics, artificial intelligence, satellites, drones, communications analysis, social media platforms, and the real-time integration of operational and intelligence information within integrated command-and-control systems.

This became evident in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where commercial satellite imagery, such as the services provided by Maxar Technologies, played a significant role in revealing military movements before operations began. Cloud technology companies such as Microsoft and Google also became part of states’ cybersecurity and information-analysis infrastructure.

The specificity of the conflict environment in the Middle East

In the Middle East, an additional specificity emerges, as the region has increasingly become an arena of conflict within the “digital conflict and competition environment” between powerful actors possessing technology, digital infrastructure, satellites, cyber capabilities, and tools of analysis and influence, and fragile or resource-limited actors that lack many of the instruments of digital power or informational independence within cyber and informational battlefields.

This reality has created a major gap in the ability to collect and analyze information, manage narratives, influence perception, and protect the national digital environment. States or actors that possess platforms, algorithms, cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence capabilities, and the integration of intelligence and military systems now hold greater capacity to understand the operational environment, shape public opinion, manage conflict, and direct political and security decision-making almost instantaneously.

Meanwhile, weaker actors often find themselves within this digital space — or “digital conflict and competition environment” — in a position of receiving, being penetrated, or being influenced by external narratives and informational pressures, without genuinely possessing the tools of control, influence, or digital independence.

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Margin of manoeuvre and action

Accordingly, intelligence superiority in the Middle East is no longer linked merely to possessing traditional surveillance tools; rather, it has become tied to the ability to understand and manage operations within this digital space, and to integrate its informational, cognitive, and operational dimensions into a comprehensive system for decision-making and influence.

In the absence of informational and cyber independence among many actors, the margin for manoeuvre and defense has become increasingly narrow. The ability to protect the digital environment and informational sovereignty has therefore become an essential component of national security and strategic power in the region.

What is the impact of electronic surveillance on the daily lives of Palestinians under occupation?

With regard to the situation of Palestinians inside the occupied territories, electronic surveillance — through the control and exploitation of the digital environment and its technologies — no longer appears to be merely a security tool linked to tracking movements or gathering information. Rather, it has become part of the daily environment within which Palestinians live, placing life itself under a continuous space of monitoring, analysis, and control.

Modern technologies — including smart cameras, facial recognition technologies, data analysis, interconnected databases, and the digital monitoring of communications and movement — now directly affect freedom of movement, privacy, social relations, patterns of gathering and communication, and even the individual sense of safety and freedom. Reports issued by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented the expanding use of biometric surveillance systems and facial recognition technologies within the occupied Palestinian territories.

In this context, the impact is no longer limited to the traditional security dimension, but has extended to the human and cognitive dimensions, as individuals and communities live under a constant sense of surveillance and the possibility of tracking and analysis. This reality directly affects daily behavior, freedom of expression, social trust, and the ability to organize and interact within the public sphere.

Multiple reports have also indicated that the digital environment has become part of the broader system of security and administrative control, whereby data, digital identity, and movement patterns are transformed into instruments of regulation and control. In the report Automated Apartheid issued by Amnesty International, the use of systems such as “Red Wolf” in the city of Hebron was documented. These systems rely on facial recognition technologies and the linking of biometric data to security screening and movement control at checkpoints. Journalistic and analytical reports have also discussed the expansion of surveillance systems and the integration of cameras and digital data networks across the West Bank and Gaza.

Reports concerning the use of intelligent data-analysis systems and data integration in Gaza have further sparked wide discussions regarding the impact of modern technology on human rights, privacy, freedoms, human security, and the limits of using artificial intelligence in conflict environments.

Human rights and technical reports have also warned that the integration of artificial intelligence, data analysis, and large-scale surveillance could lead to an unprecedented expansion in capabilities of control and targeting, particularly in environments already suffering from humanitarian and security fragility.

Has media warfare become an essential part of conflict?

Absolutely yes. Media warfare has become one of the most important fronts of modern conflict because it operates directly within the cognitive dimension of the “digital space.” The battle is no longer fought solely over control of territory, but also over control of the narrative, perception, and what people see, understand, and believe.

Images, short video clips, live broadcasts, hashtags, and content circulated across digital platforms have all become part of conflict management on a global scale. Smartphones and digital platforms have simultaneously become tools of documentation, influence, and mobilization.

In the war in Gaza, for example, footage emerging directly from the field played a major role in influencing global public opinion, reinterpreting events, exerting political and media pressure, and transforming the digital sphere into a parallel battlefield alongside the physical conflict.

In the Russo-Ukrainian War, it became even clearer how digital platforms had become part of the operational environment of conflict, playing a central role in shaping public opinion, influencing international support, managing political and military narratives, and transforming information and imagery into tools of mobilization and strategic influence.

The war in Sudan also emerged as another example of this transformation, especially during the early years of the conflict, when digital platforms witnessed extensive circulation of videos coming directly from the battlefield, particularly from the side of the Rapid Support Forces. These forces intensively used field recordings and live broadcasts to display movements, deployment, and territorial control, transforming imagery and battlefield scenes into instruments of psychological, media, and cognitive influence.

In many cases, digital platforms themselves became extensions of the battlefield, to the extent that the distinction between military action, documentation, propaganda, psychological warfare, and perception management became increasingly blurred.

Within this context, deepfake technologies and generative artificial intelligence have also emerged as new tools capable of producing misleading content, visually and media-wise reconstructing reality, and exerting psychological and cognitive influence over societies and audiences.

Accordingly, media warfare is no longer merely a propagandistic tool accompanying conflict; it has become part of its operational and strategic structure. Influencing perception and public opinion has become no less important than direct military impact, while controlling the narrative and managing the flow of information have become essential elements in the management of modern wars and contemporary conflicts.

Does national security justify intelligence alliances with politically different states?

The modern digital environment, and the conflict arenas associated with it, are by nature spaces in which traditional geographical borders have become less significant, while access, communication, and influence have become broad, transnational, and capable of crossing states and societies. Within the “modern global digital environment,” data, communications, cyberattacks, influence campaigns, organized crime networks, and armed groups are all capable of operating through an open and interconnected space. As a result, security threats are no longer confined within the geographical boundaries of the state as they once were.

For this reason, many states have become compelled to build networks of cooperation and intelligence and security alliances even with parties that differ from them politically or ideologically, particularly in matters related to counterterrorism, cybersecurity, transnational organized crime, and the protection of critical infrastructure.

This became especially evident after the September 11 attacks, when networks for information exchange and security and intelligence coordination expanded significantly among major powers and a number of states, including Arab and Islamic countries, in order to confront armed groups and transnational criminal networks. International coordination also became prominent in addressing cyberattacks targeting critical and vital infrastructures such as energy networks, telecommunications, banks, airports, and government systems.

As one manifestation of this new interconnected security environment within the global digital sphere, major technology companies, cloud infrastructures, and global communications platforms have, in recent years, become part of this broader security and information ecosystem, making the relationship between national security and technology more complex than ever before.

At the same time, however, the danger lies in this cooperation evolving into a form of informational or technological dependency, especially given the reliance of many states on foreign cloud infrastructures, external operating and analytical systems, global digital platforms, and communications technologies over which they do not possess full control.

In such circumstances, national data, informational infrastructure, or even security decision-making itself may become vulnerable to influence, penetration, or external pressure. Therefore, the real challenge lies not merely in building intelligence alliances, but in achieving a delicate balance between the requirements of security cooperation and the preservation of informational sovereignty, cyber independence, and national capacity to manage data and the digital environment independently and securely.

Who prevails in modern wars: Those with the strongest weapons or the most accurate information?

In modern warfare, superiority is no longer linked solely to possessing the most powerful weapons, but rather to the ability to produce, analyse, integrate, and manage accurate information more rapidly and effectively than one’s adversary, and to connect that information with institutional systems of power and influence capable of decision-making and action.

Weapons today no longer operate independently from the informational conflict environment; instead, they have become part of an integrated system based on sensing, analysis, real-time communication, artificial intelligence, and the linking of data to operational and battlefield decision-making. Accurate information has thus become a “force multiplier,” granting actors capable of collecting and analyzing it an advantage that may at times exceed the value of material military strength itself.

This became clearly evident in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where intelligence, satellite imagery, data analysis, and drones played a central role in directing battlefield operations and managing combat in real time. The use of commercial satellite imagery, the analysis of military movements, and the integration of battlefield information into digital systems enabled the creation of a comprehensive operational picture that helped expose movements, identify targets, improve responsiveness, and increase the efficiency of military force deployment. In this way, the informational environment itself became part of the structure of modern warfare.

Within this context, modern weapons systems have increasingly come to depend on intelligent sensing, instant analysis, networked communications, and guidance systems driven by data and artificial intelligence. Military power, therefore, no longer resides solely in the platform or weapon itself, but also in the informational environment that operates, supplies, and directs it.

Accordingly, it can be argued that modern wars are not decided only by those who possess the strongest weapons, but by those who possess the greatest ability to understand the operational environment, transform data into knowledge, knowledge into decisions, and decisions into rapid and precise action within the “digital conflict and competition environment” in which contemporary wars now unfold.

How have internal conflicts in Sudan affected the performance of security and intelligence institutions?

As is widely recognized, the internal conflicts associated with the ongoing war in Sudan have profoundly affected the structure of the country’s security and intelligence institutions. They have weakened the unity of the state’s informational sphere and diminished its instruments of control, while also leading to multiple centers of decision-making, weak coordination, and a declining ability to produce unified security and intelligence assessments.

Within an environment of prolonged conflict, information has ceased to be merely a tool for managing security; it has itself become part of the conflict — whether through controlling the flow of information, employing it for media purposes, using it for mobilization and influence, or directly utilizing it in the management of military and political operations.

This transformation became especially visible in the Sudanese war, where drones, media warfare, digital platforms, live broadcasting, and battlefield footage all emerged as influential elements in both managing the conflict and shaping perceptions of it. During the early years of the war, digital platforms experienced a massive surge in visual content, particularly from areas of combat and military deployment, where images and short videos became tools for demonstrating control, exerting psychological influence, mobilization, and managing the narrative surrounding the conflict.

Video footage and live broadcasts — especially from the side of the Rapid Support Forces — played a major role in conveying immediate battlefield imagery and transforming digital platforms themselves into extensions of the battlefield. As a result, the distinction between military action, documentation, propaganda, psychological warfare, and perception management became increasingly blurred.

This reality reflects the transformation of the war in Sudan from merely a conventional battlefield confrontation into a complex informational–technological–operational conflict in which disciplined and undisciplined actors, both domestic and external, operate within the “digital space” through media, platforms, communications, drones, information analysis, narrative management, and psychological influence.

Amid this complexity, security and intelligence institutions now face major challenges that extend beyond the military battlefield itself. These challenges also involve the ability to protect and exploit the informational environment, manage the flow of information, preserve trust, and construct a unified operational picture within a highly interconnected and ambiguous digital environment.

Can political stability be achieved without a strong and unified intelligence service?

Evidence suggests that it is difficult to achieve political stability in states facing internal threats or complex conflict environments without the existence of a professional and unified intelligence service. However, what is meant here is not the creation of an institution based on political domination or expanded surveillance, but rather an institution capable of producing a shared national assessment, identifying risks and threats at an early stage, and supporting the state’s institutional decision-making within a highly complex informational and security environment.

In the era of the “digital space” and the digital conflict arena, threats are no longer limited to traditional military movements. They now include disinformation, psychological influence, cyberattacks, societal polarization, digital mobilization, and external interventions conducted through platforms, media, and digital networks.

For this reason, the state has become increasingly dependent on an institution capable of understanding and analyzing information flows, while integrating security, political, social, and economic indicators into a comprehensive picture that helps manage risks before they escalate into crises or open conflicts.

The experiences of many countries that have undergone internal conflicts or security collapses have demonstrated that weak informational coordination or the existence of multiple security and intelligence decision-making centers often leads to escalating chaos, the spread of armed groups, and the weakening of the state’s ability to manage the public sphere and protect its institutions.

This can be observed in a number of fragile environments that experienced the collapse or fragmentation of security institutions, where the digital conflict arena itself became an open space for mobilization, disinformation, the management of competing narratives, and the exploitation of internal divisions.

In Sudan, for example, digital platforms and circulated content clearly contributed to complicating the informational landscape. Other experiences — such as certain stages of the conflicts in Libya, Iraq, and Syria — also demonstrated how multiple security actors and weak informational coordination can create opportunities for the rise of armed groups, external interventions, and the erosion of trust in state institutions.

Conversely, the existence of a professional and effective intelligence service does not merely mean collecting information. It also means possessing the capacity to build early warning systems, understand the informational environment, analyze societal transformations, manage cyber and cognitive risks, protect the digital conflict arena from penetration and external influence, and support the institutional stability of the state.

Accordingly, the role of modern intelligence institutions has become increasingly connected to protecting national security, managing and safeguarding the informational environment, preserving societal trust, and maintaining digital sovereignty — not solely to the traditional security dimension associated with surveillance or field operations.

What is the role of intelligence services in preventing the spread of armed groups and tribal conflicts?

The role of intelligence institutions in fragile environments can be understood primarily as an attempt to develop an early understanding of transformations and threats before they evolve into open or prolonged conflicts. In many cases, conflicts do not begin suddenly; rather, they gradually take shape through indicators related to the escalation of hostile rhetoric, tribal mobilization, changes in patterns of financing and communication, arms movements, or the media and propaganda activities of armed groups within both the physical and digital domains.

From this perspective, the function of modern intelligence appears closer to interpreting the social, cognitive, and informational environment within which these groups operate, rather than merely collecting traditional security information concerning individuals or battlefield movements.

In many fragile environments, such as parts of the African Sahel or Sudan, armed groups can increasingly be observed relying on digital platforms, encrypted applications, and media warfare not only for communication purposes, but also for recruitment, mobilization, narrative dissemination, and the management of psychological and social influence.

Video footage, live broadcasts, and content circulated across digital platforms are also being used prominently to demonstrate power, influence local communities, or reshape public perception regarding conflict. In the Sudanese case, for example, the digital environment during the war appeared not merely as a space for reporting news or documenting events, but gradually transformed into part of the digital conflict arena itself, where mobilizing rhetoric, reproduced polarization, and content related to battles and armed deployment circulated intensively.

Accordingly, the challenge facing intelligence institutions today may be understood as extending beyond the traditional security field into a far more complex and interconnected environment involving the understanding of social transformations, the analysis of the informational environment, and the monitoring of patterns of digital mobilization and cognitive influence within societies.

For this reason, preventing the spread of armed groups or containing tribal conflicts no longer appears to depend solely on direct security or military measures. It is also linked to the ability to understand and manage the digital conflict arena, and to protect the informational and societal sphere from escalation, incitement, and increasing polarization.

How do regional and international interventions affect Sudanese security?

The nature of the conflict in Sudan indicates that regional and international interventions have become an additional factor complicating the security and informational environment, adding new layers of complexity to the conflict landscape. Each external actor typically enters with its own interests, tools, and vision regarding the balance of power within the state and the region.

In this context, the impact is not limited solely to the military or political dimensions, but also extends to media influence, informational influence, logistical support, narrative management, and activities conducted within the digital conflict arena.

From this perspective, the Sudanese conflict no longer appears confined to its internal framework alone; rather, it has become intertwined with broader regional and international environments. This has gradually contributed to complicating the overall landscape, prolonging the conflict, and transforming it into an arena of both geopolitical and informational competition simultaneously.

It can also be observed that the digital environment itself has become part of this interconnectedness, as digital platforms and transnational media increasingly play a role in shaping perceptions, reproducing narratives, and influencing both domestic and international public opinion regarding the conflict.

In many cases, it becomes difficult to separate information from political influence, propaganda, and perception management within an open and transnational digital environment. Consequently, regional and international interventions affect not only battlefield balances, but also the informational and cognitive sphere within which societies and institutions operate.

In the Sudanese case in particular, this overlap between internal and external factors appears to have created an extremely complex environment in which regional interests, international pressures, media coverage, digital platforms, and informational influences intersect within a compound conflict arena that is difficult to address using traditional tools alone.

Accordingly, Sudanese security today may be understood as being linked not only to protecting borders or managing battlefield conflict, but also to the ability to manage the informational environment and the digital conflict arena, while understanding the impact of external actors on perception, stability, and decision-making within both the state and society.

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Do economic challenges weaken a state’s intelligence capabilities?

The modern digital environment reflects the growing interconnection between economic challenges and a state’s intelligence capabilities, as contemporary intelligence no longer depends solely on human resources or traditional field operations. Instead, it has become increasingly tied to digital infrastructure, technology, data centers, specialized human expertise, cybersecurity, and systems of analysis, communication, and sensing.

Accordingly, any prolonged economic decline may directly affect a state’s ability to develop its informational infrastructure, protect its cyberspace, attract skilled personnel, and maintain technical and intelligence readiness within the digital conflict arena.

In many cases, the impact of economic crises is not limited to the institutional level alone, but also extends to the social and informational environment surrounding the state. Weak institutions, rising levels of social fragility, and declining services and economic opportunities may create environments that are more vulnerable to disinformation, recruitment, polarization, or organized crime, particularly within societies already living under prolonged political or security pressures.

Moreover, the digital space itself may, under such conditions, become fertile ground for rumors, information campaigns, mobilizing rhetoric, and attempts at external influence.

Within this context, economic security no longer appears separate from national security or intelligence security. Rather, it has become a direct component of the state’s capacity to protect its institutions and society within a highly interconnected digital and informational environment.

For this reason, building modern intelligence capabilities is not linked solely to providing security tools, but also to the existence of a stable economic structure, institutions capable of investing in technology and knowledge, and a social environment that is less vulnerable to penetration, influence, and recruitment within the digital conflict arena.

How can Sudan develop its cybersecurity amid the current conflicts?

Under the current conflicts, cybersecurity in Sudan cannot be viewed as a technical project to be postponed until after stability is achieved. Rather, it should be understood as one of the very conditions necessary for stability itself.

A state whose institutions are fragmented, whose services are disrupted, and whose informational sphere is exposed to disinformation and penetration requires at least a minimum level of digital protection in order to preserve decision-making, services, trust, and communication between institutions and society.

The nature of the “digital space” within which societies and states now operate also means that any fragility in the informational environment or cyber infrastructure can quickly become a point of security, political, and societal vulnerability at the same time.

From this perspective, Sudan can begin developing its cybersecurity through a realistic and gradual approach based on protecting vital government infrastructure, securing national data, training personnel, enhancing digital awareness, and building national capabilities for responding to cyber incidents.

The current conflicts make institutions more vulnerable to cyber intrusions, service disruption, data leakage, and informational influence, which necessitates building at least a basic defensive capability even under conditions of incomplete stability.

At the same time, developing national capacities in data analysis, monitoring digital disinformation, and protecting the state’s informational infrastructure has become increasingly necessary, especially as the digital conflict arena has turned into a direct component of political, security, and cognitive conflict.

Within this context, cyber threats cannot be separated from the surrounding social and political environment, because rumors, inciting rhetoric, information leaks, and attacks on public trust can all affect the resilience of both the state and society. If not managed within a clear national framework, these dynamics may contribute to increased chaos and division.

Accordingly, cybersecurity is no longer merely a technical issue related only to protecting systems and networks. It has become increasingly linked to the broader concepts of national sovereignty, protection of decision-making, preservation of societal trust, and management of the “digital space” within which both the state and society operate.

From this perspective, building Sudanese cybersecurity may be understood as part of a broader process aimed at rebuilding the institutional capacity of the state and strengthening its informational and cognitive cohesion within a highly complex and interconnected conflict environment.

Contemporary digital transformations also suggest that states lacking even a minimum capacity to protect their informational infrastructure, manage the digital space, and effectively employ modern technology may become increasingly vulnerable to penetration, external influence, erosion of trust, and loss of control over the national informational sphere.

In the Sudanese case specifically, cybersecurity cannot be separated from the process of digital transformation, the rebuilding of state institutions, and the necessity of empowering them. Any movement toward digitizing services, building modern informational infrastructure, developing more efficient and interconnected institutions, strengthening the digital economy, and managing resources and services intelligently will remain vulnerable to fragility, penetration, and declining trust unless accompanied by a coherent national framework for cyber protection and information management.

Accordingly, integrating cybersecurity into digital transformation does not appear to be an additional technical option, but rather a fundamental requirement for state stability, institutional continuity, the creation of a more supportive environment for development, the restoration of trust, the reduction of fragility, and the establishment of more favorable conditions for sustainable peace within both society and the state.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.