The war launched by President Donald Trump — cheered on with theatrical confidence by Benjamin Netanyahu — was never a war for the Iranian people, nor a strategic effort to reshape the Middle East, nor even a coherent attempt to “deter” Iran. It was a campaign without a defined end-state, without a political vision, and without an exit strategy. Predictably, it ended as a lose–lose conflict, with none of the objectives Trump promised ever materializing: the theocratic regime did not fall, Iran’s regional project was not neutralized, and its power was not diminished in any meaningful or lasting way.
As Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, director of Iran Human Rights, put it bluntly: “This war was never about the rights of the Iranian people… the authorities used it as a pretext to intensify repression.” A woman in Tehran, identifying herself only as Sima for fear of reprisal, offered an even starker assessment: “Any peace with the Islamic Republic is a peace with my tormentors.”
These voices are not emotional outbursts; they are evidence that the war changed nothing inside Iran. If anything, it handed the regime a familiar and useful narrative — the language of siege and victimhood — which it has mastered for four decades.
Thirteen thousand airstrikes, as David Blair of The Telegraph reminds us, did not topple the regime, dismantle the Revolutionary Guard, or curtail Iran’s regional influence. Instead, the campaign ended with a hurried, partial agreement with the very leadership Trump once vowed to remove.
The question echoing across regional capitals is unavoidable: Was this agreement worth four months of war, billions of dollars, the depletion of U.S. weapons stockpiles, and strained relations with allies?
The honest answer is no.
Washington achieved none of the strategic outcomes it claimed to seek. A genuine victory would have required a real degradation of Iran’s capabilities, a measurable shift in its regional behavior, binding constraints on its missile program, or a decisive resolution of the nuclear file. None of this happened. As Alan Eyre of the Middle East Institute observed, “The United States has already spent its strongest card — the threat of force. We used it, and they are still standing. What leverage is left?”
Iran, for its part, did not win militarily in any conventional sense. It suffered painful blows, lost senior commanders, and absorbed significant damage. But it emerged politically unbroken — and in the Middle East, survival itself becomes a form of victory. As one expert told AFP: “Iran achieved its objective in this war — it survived.”
Yet the greatest loser was neither Washington nor Tehran, but the Gulf states. While the United States negotiated with Iran, Gulf countries absorbed the cost: Iranian missiles, Iraqi militia drones, and attacks on critical infrastructure. A Reuters investigation revealed that the Revolutionary Guard established new covert cells in Iraq to strike Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — bypassing traditional militias to avoid detection.
In other words: the Gulf took the hits, and Iran took the agreement.
This is the central paradox. The states that hoped the war would weaken Iran instead found themselves facing an agreement that restores Tehran as an indispensable negotiating partner. The U.S.–Iran understanding has left Gulf governments with political pockets full of air: Iran was not deterred, its Iraqi proxies were not dismantled, and regional security did not improve.
The war exposed the fragility of the Gulf’s security architecture and revealed that Washington views engagement with Tehran as a strategic necessity, not a last resort.
Who, then, will trust Trump after this? Only those willing to play the role he assigns them. Trump defended the agreement by calling critics “jealous, foolish, or malicious.” Yet American negotiators themselves — including former deputy secretary of state Wendy Sherman — were clear: “This agreement resolves none of the core issues, imposes no meaningful constraints on Iran, and will not alter its regional behavior.”
Alan Eyre went further: “We used the military option… and they are still standing. What do we threaten them with now?”
The conclusion is difficult to escape. This was a war without a victor, followed by an agreement from which Iran emerged with enough political oxygen to claim it had not been defeated.
The United States exits the conflict without a strategy, without leverage, and without the ability to impose new terms. The Gulf states exit more aware than ever that their security cannot be outsourced to the shifting priorities of others.
In the Middle East, it is often enough not to lose in order to declare victory.
Iran has done exactly that.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
