Terrorist financiers in Nigeria are continually exploiting identities that can obscure the trail of illicit money, including accounts belonging to deceased persons, bank accounts registered to women, and telephone numbers tied to unrelated third parties, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit has disclosed.
The agency also identified an emerging crowdfunding system in which foreign-based facilitators solicit small donations online under the guise of humanitarian relief or educational assistance before consolidating the proceeds and routing them through a network of intermediaries in Nigeria.
The findings were contained in the NFIU’s 2025 Annual Report, which examined trends in terrorist financing, fraud, and other financial crimes during the year.
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According to the agency, the crowdfunding arrangements are built to make individual transactions appear insignificant while allowing substantial sums to accumulate over time. Foreign-based facilitators reportedly use social media to reach sympathisers and encrypted platforms, including Telegram and Signal, to distribute payment links and bank details.
The report said individual contributions typically range from $50 to $500, a pattern that can reduce the likelihood of automated anti-money laundering systems immediately flagging the transactions.
Once sufficient funds have accumulated, the proceeds are transferred into a central account controlled by a senior member of the network. The money is then broken into smaller payments and channelled through international money transfer operators and remittance applications to recipients in Nigeria.
The NFIU identified students, small-business operators, and relatives among those who could serve as money mules.
The agency said the recipients could convert the funds into cash or use them to obtain items with both legitimate and illicit applications, including motorcycles, fertilisers, and satellite internet equipment. The money could subsequently be passed to logistics coordinators and field operatives.
The financial trail can become even more difficult to follow when terrorist financiers employ proxy accounts.
The NFIU said some networks have opened accounts in women’s names while male commanders or logistics personnel secretly control them. Wives, sisters, and female associates may be used as fronts in order to allow the actual handlers to distance themselves from suspicious transactions.
The report noted that some women whose identities are used in this manner may not know the scale or purpose of transactions conducted through their accounts.
The agency also flagged telephone numbers that do not correspond with the actual beneficiaries of bank accounts. Such numbers, it said, can include SIM cards registered to deceased persons or third parties, creating a disconnect between an account holder, a telephone number and the individual controlling the funds.
That disconnect can complicate investigations because tracing a suspicious transaction may initially lead authorities to a person who has no genuine connection with the financing network.
The NFIU further identified distinct transaction patterns among terrorist cells. It said groups linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) sometimes use detailed transaction descriptions as an internal accounting mechanism, with logistics payments sent from central sources to multiple recipients.
In other cases, the agency found that facilitators deliberately use coded descriptions, innocuous expressions, and alphanumeric combinations to conceal the purpose of transfers and evade automated bank monitoring.
The report said some operators also switch between languages in their transaction descriptions to frustrate keyword-based detection systems.
Apart from that, the NFIU described Nigeria’s financial crime environment in 2025 as increasingly intertwined with technology, digital platforms, and cross-border transactions.
It identified Ponzi schemes, fraudulent crowdfunding, cryptocurrency investment scams, and hacking-related fraud as significant areas of concern. Fintech onboarding weaknesses, particularly accounts requiring limited identification, were also cited as potential avenues for abuse.
The agency further reported vulnerabilities in the handling of public funds, including alleged diversion through accounts belonging to finance officers and associated third parties. Procurement processes and heavy reliance on cash were also identified as areas that can complicate financial monitoring and asset tracing.
The NFIU said the intelligence gathered from its analysis had been converted into advisories, executive alerts, and other intelligence products for relevant authorities, reporting institutions and policymakers.
The findings, therefore, underscore a shift in the financial tactics confronting Nigeria’s counter-terrorism agencies. Rather than relying solely on conspicuous transfers, the networks identified by the NFIU are increasingly exploiting ordinary banking relationships, digital platforms, proxy identities, and fragmented payments to make illicit financing harder to detect.
