The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden represent not only key geopolitical hubs in the Middle East, but also critical elements of the global energy supply chain and international trade.
Growing attacks by Iran-backed proxy groups, including Houthi actions against international shipping, threats to energy infrastructure, and the deepening US-Iran stand-off in recent times, have turned the region into one of the most vulnerable areas of global security.
Since the end of the Cold War, the security architecture of the Gulf of Basra has largely been built around the military presence of the United States.
The Gulf monarchies, faced with the development of the Iranian nuclear programme and the strengthening of Tehran’s regional influence, relied on American security guarantees.
However, recent events increasingly indicate that the existing model no longer fully corresponds to the nature of new threats.
Today, the main danger lies not only in the possibility of interstate war.
Disruption of maritime transport routes, risks to energy supplies, the spread of proxy conflicts, and attacks on international trade have greatly expanded the very understanding of security.
In modern conditions, security is increasingly closely linked to economic stability and the protection of international trade corridors.
That is why a new geopolitical balance is gradually taking shape in the Middle East.
On the one hand, Iran and the armed groups it supports use sea communications and transport corridors as an instrument of strategic pressure.
On the other hand, the Gulf states are striving to form collective security mechanisms capable of protecting international trade routes.
Israel views regional security not as a system of collective security, but primarily through the prism of its own national interests, considering the strategic weakening of its adversaries to be one of the key elements of its own security concept.
In this logic, Israel often seeks to use the regional influence of the US to advance its own strategic interests.
The US, in turn, while maintaining a military presence in the Middle East, is increasingly seeking to redistribute the burden of ensuring regional security among its allies.
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At this juncture, the volatile region needs a new paradigm, one that does not simply imply ousting the US from the region.
On the contrary, given the network of US military bases in the Gulf countries, the operational capabilities of CENTCOM, air and missile defence systems, as well as the permanent presence of the US Navy, Washington will remain one of the key elements of the regional security architecture for a long time to come.
Consequently, the proposed model is based not on replacing the American presence, but on a more rational distribution of responsibility between the US and regional states.
With this approach, the main burden of ensuring day-to-day regional security will gradually shift to regional states, while the US will retain the role of a strategic guarantor, providing military-technical, intelligence, and operational support.
On July 30, Saudi Arabia announced the ‘Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance’ initiative, which received official support and approval of the draft charter from 14 states, including Türkiye.
This initiative should be seen not only as a military response to the Houthi attacks, but also as one of the first institutional steps towards the formation of a new security architecture in the Gulf of Basra.
However, all of this raises a much more important question. Can new military alliances by themselves ensure long-term security in the Middle East? In my opinion, the answer is no.
The problem is that today’s security threats in the Middle East are multidimensional.
Terrorism, proxy wars, energy security, the protection of maritime communications, and economic sustainability do not exist in isolation. Consequently, the security system has to be built as a multi-level and complex model.
That is why it is advisable to go beyond the classical understanding of military alliances and propose a model of strategic division of responsibility.
Unlike traditional alliances, which primarily answer the question “Who will fight with us?”, the proposed model is based on a different principle: “What contribution can each participant make to ensuring common security, based on its capabilities?”
According to the model of strategic division of responsibility, regional security should not be based on the equal participation of all states, but on the distribution of functions in accordance with the military, economic, and geopolitical potential of each participant.
Thus, Türkiye can contribute thanks to its developed military-industrial complex, naval capabilities, logistics infrastructure and diplomatic mediation potential.
Saudi Arabia, thanks to financial resources, air forces and a network of naval bases. Egypt, thanks to control of the Suez Canal and the presence of significant ground forces. And Pakistan, due to the nuclear deterrence potential and a developed system of military education.
The Gulf states will be able to ensure the stability of the overall security system through their energy infrastructure and port network. In such an architecture, no state is the only guarantor of security.
On the contrary, regional security is shaped by the complementary contributions of states with different capabilities and specialisations.
The effectiveness of this model depends primarily on a clear definition of the common strategic interest.
Such an interest should not be the security of an individual state, but ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of international trade, sea communications and key transport corridors.
This understanding of a common goal can minimise contradictions between coalition members and create a stronger basis for long-term cooperation.
