Among others, Iranian parliamentarians Mahmoud Nabavian and Kamran Ghazanfari have publicly accused the current political leadership of launching a coup to silence anti-deal factions.
These figures are largely aligned with Jebhe-ye Paydari (Endurance Front), a leading conservative group that consistently advocates resistance to Western pressure and remains deeply sceptical of negotiations with Washington.
“Although the Paydari Front is not formally part of the IRGC, it has long been regarded as politically and ideologically aligned with many elements of the revolutionary Guards,” Tural Akhundov, a political analyst at Baku-based Crescent Research Center, tells TRT World.
“The two share core positions, including opposition to rapprochement with the US and support for Iran’s regional ‘Axis of Resistance’ emphasising military deterrence and revolutionary principles,” Akhundov says.
Despite the growing influence of hardliners such as Paydari Front, Iran’s increasingly complex political structure cannot allow one faction to run the Shia-majority country, according to experts.
“It is difficult to verify the extent to which these views alone shape official decision-making, as Iran’s political system is complex and policy is influenced by multiple institutions, including the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council, the presidency, parliament, and the IRGC,” Akhundov says.
“It is also important to distinguish between political rhetoric and actual policy. While calls for retaliation or a tougher stance may be voiced domestically, Iran’s leadership has historically sought to calibrate its responses to avoid an uncontrolled military confrontation with the United States. Strategic restraint has often accompanied strong public messaging.”
Zaccara also believes that hardliners are unlikely to seek “an unlimited war”, as many of them “appear to favour calibrated escalation that preserves pressure on Washington without provoking an uncontrollable conflict”.
He also refers to Iran’s complex political structure, where one hardliner faction cannot dictate policy. “The debate is about how to implement diplomacy rather than whether diplomacy should exist at all,” he says.
“A durable agreement will require compromises from both governments, not simply the weakening of Iran’s hardline camp.”
But other analysts point out that Khamenei’s violent death, in the context of foreign attacks on Iran’s sovereignty, has led to the emergence of a new era in which Tehran’s old strategic patience doctrine, based on limited retaliations, has been replaced by a more aggressive approach led by younger IRGC cadres advocating tit-for-tat attacks against its enemies.
“In my sense the question is not whether hardliners chose to escalate, but whether anyone in the Iranian system still holds the authority not to,” says Nencini.
Ali Akbar Dareini, a Tehran-based Iranian political analyst, voices a similar view.
“The possibility of a real peace deal between Iran and the current US administration is almost nil,” Dareini tells TRT World, referring to the American assassination of Khamenei and attacks against school kids in Minab, which he describes as war crimes.
“The MoU is part of the war.”
Internal debate
While there are too many factions in the Iranian political system, which largely has its roots in the Shia school of thought people belong to, it ultimately comes down to the character of a possible US-Iran deal that could bring political stability and economic prosperity to Tehran.
Many Iranians do not want a repeat of the JCPOA, the 2015 nuclear deal between Tehran and the Obama administration, according to Iranian journalist Fatemeh Karimkhan.
Like many experts, she believes that differing interpretations of the MoU’s Hormuz clause have led to current US-Iran tensions.
The US thought that Iran should open the Hormuz Strait in exchange for economic benefits it would receive, while Tehran felt it would give up its most effective tool without receiving any tangible gains from the West, she says.
“This is exactly the classic asymmetry that was also seen in the JCPOA experience: a quick technical step from Tehran in exchange for an ambiguous and fragile economic benefit from Washington,” Karimkhan tells TRT World.
“Plus, the possibility of filling the arsenals of the US and Israel through the ceasefire.”
According to experts, the Iranian debate centres on whether the country should be satisfied with US political concessions codified in the MoU, wait for tangible results in the future, or demand immediate benefits before agreeing to open the Strait of Hormuz.
Akhunov echoes Karimkhan’s views.
While some Iranian political actors remain sceptical of negotiations, arguing that previous diplomatic efforts, such as the JCPOA, did not deliver the expected economic or strategic benefits, others see diplomacy as a necessary tool for reducing tensions and easing international pressure, says Akhunov.
“It would be too simplistic to say that Iran’s hardliners alone are blocking a peace deal with the US. The obstacles are much broader and exist on both sides. Iran’s conservative factions remain sceptical of negotiations because they argue that the previous 2015 nuclear deal did not deliver the expected economic benefits after the US withdrew from the agreement,” he tells TRT World.
“This has reinforced distrust toward Washington.”
