US presidents’ National Security Strategies accurately reflect the direction of their foreign policies, which are governed by American interests that are not always explicitly stated, yet are not difficult to surmise. The National Security Strategy is an official presidential document issued by the President of the United States outlining the country’s national security and foreign policy priorities.These strategies are shaped by political developments around the world and by the ways in which the United States responds to them in pursuit of its objectives, even when this comes at the expense of the countries in the regions concerned, including its own allies.
For example, President Joe Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy, issued eight months after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, made no attempt to conceal his support for Ukraine and his determination to deter Russia, placing particular emphasis on Europe’s role in supporting the war in a manner distinct from that of his counterparts. Biden’s strategy differentiated between China and Russia, describing the former as a competitor and the latter as a threat. The document stated that the United States was leading a united and resolute response to the Russian invasion. By contrast, President Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy of 2015, which came after Russia’s seizure of Crimea, described the move as aggression but did not regard Russia as a threat. The document also stated that military presence, exercises, and deployments in Central and Eastern Europe were intended to deter further Russian aggression, while at the same time leaving the door open to greater cooperation with Russia in areas of mutual interest. President Donald Trump’s two National Security Strategies, published in 2017 and 2025 during his two terms in office, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 respectively, described Russia differently from the Biden administration. The 2017 strategy portrayed Russia as a revisionist power, while the 2025 strategy did not place Russia in the same category of threat as the Biden administration had done. The first proposed a range of hybrid mechanisms to deter Russia, whereas the second focused on managing relations with Moscow as a means of restoring stability. In all cases, however, the Biden administration’s characterisation of Russia and its approach to deterring it were stronger and more confrontational than those found in any of the other presidents’ strategies.
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Yet this did not depart from an objective shared by all administrations: reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, a theme reflected in every previous National Security Strategy. Obama’s 2015 strategy warned that Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, together with Russia’s willingness to use energy for political purposes, had heightened the risks. Biden’s 2022 strategy explicitly called for reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, whereas Trump’s 2017 and 2025 strategies advocated diversifying Europe’s energy supplies without mentioning Russia by name. Biden’s strategy employed the strongest language directed specifically at Europe’s dependence on Russia.
Senior US officials made no secret of their dissatisfaction with European countries’ purchases of Russian energy. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, around 28% of the European Union’s crude oil imports came from Russia, compared with just 9% from the United States.
Russia also supplied 52% of Europe’s coal and solid fossil fuels, while the United States accounted for only 15%. In addition, more than 44% of the EU’s natural gas imports came from Russia. Russia was the EU’s fifth-largest export market and its third-largest source of imports. Even so, the EU’s trade in goods with the United States was roughly two and a half times greater than its trade with Russia, although Russia remained a significant competitor to the United States among its closest allies.
These figures help explain why major European powers such as Germany and France sought a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine. Before the war, and amid rising tensions, the United States and Ukraine signed an updated Charter on Strategic Partnership in 2021, reaffirming support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and its path towards NATO membership. Germany and France, however, viewed these developments as inflaming the crisis. French President Emmanuel Macron described Russia as historically and geographically part of the European sphere. This unfolded against Russia’s view that NATO’s eastward expansion towards Ukraine, the prospect of Ukrainian membership, and Western military training and arms support constituted a direct security threat and heightened the risk of confrontation.
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As a result of the war, Europe has incurred substantial economic, social and security costs, while energy prices, competitiveness, defence spending and the refugee burden remain long-term challenges. The European Council has described the war and its consequences as an “existential challenge to the European Union.”
A similar pattern emerges from the US National Security Strategies towards the Middle East under the past four administrations, culminating in the devastating war against Iran, whose consequences have affected every country in the region and whose trajectory and repercussions remain uncertain.
Trump’s 2017 and 2025 National Security Strategies, published during his two terms in office, point more clearly than those of his predecessors to the likelihood that a war with Iran would erupt and escalate under his presidency.
From Obama’s 2010 strategy to Trump’s 2025 strategy, all four administrations embraced a pivot from the Middle East towards Asia and greater reliance on allies to defend themselves and deter adversaries. Their approaches to Iran nevertheless differed, even though every strategy identified it as a source of regional instability. Obama’s 2010 strategy called on Iran to integrate into the region, while his 2015 strategy referred to working with allies to reach an agreement with Tehran. Biden’s strategy favoured diplomacy in dealing with Iran, without ruling out other options.
By contrast, Trump adopted a markedly different approach to Iran from the outset of his first term. His 2017 National Security Strategy identified Iran as a principal regional adversary and a source of instability, stressing the need to deny the Iranian regime access to nuclear weapons and to counter its regional influence. The strategy published in June last year, only months after the war, states that US military force had already been used against Iran’s nuclear programme and presents the weakening of Iran as a positive development that has reshaped the Middle East. Trump’s strategies thus clearly reflect a policy aimed at destroying Iran rather than reaching an accommodation with it, unlike those of Obama and Biden, which left open the possibility of containing it.
This was also closely linked to the United States’ strategy for reshaping relations among its regional allies. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy marked a clear shift in its approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, portraying it as a major obstacle to regional peace and to deeper political and economic cooperation against Iran. This was reflected in the Abraham Accords, which Trump promoted in 2020. Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy likewise embraced Trump’s emphasis on normalisation and the Abraham Accords, despite also referring to the two-state solution. By contrast, Obama’s 2010 and 2015 strategies did not present normalisation as a regional track independent of the Palestinian issue.
Trump adopted a practical approach to overcome the lack of full success in the regional political normalisation process. On 15 January 2021, in the final days of his first administration, the Department of Defense announced a revision to the Unified Command Plan, transferring Israel from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM). Since CENTCOM was established in 1983, Israel had remained outside its area of responsibility and was assigned instead to EUCOM because most Arab states within CENTCOM’s jurisdiction boycotted Israel. The decision enabled Israel to operate alongside its Arab partners within the same framework. Operational implementation began under the Biden administration, with missile defence identified as one of the principal areas of cooperation on the grounds of the threat posed by Iranian missiles. In April 2024, the clearest public demonstration of this regional defence network came when Iran launched more than 300 missiles and drones towards Israel.
Trump’s position and strategies cannot be separated from the political developments that took place in the region during his presidency, which could undermine the balance of power that Washington has sought to establish and may be among the reasons behind the current US escalation against Iran. The parallel development of the Gulf states’ relations with Russia, China and Iran, following their adoption of a policy of diversifying international partnerships and reducing tensions with neighbouring countries, posed a threat to Washington’s plans. Signs of this shift became increasingly evident after 2019, particularly following the attacks on Aramco’s facilities, which raised questions among the Gulf states about the extent of the United States’ willingness to engage in a direct confrontation in defence of its partners.
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Oil cooperation between the Gulf states and Russia continued after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the Gulf states did not join the comprehensive Western sanctions regime against Moscow. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Iraq also maintained their coordination with Russia through OPEC+ on production cuts and market management, with Russia remaining a key partner. At the 2023 Riyadh Summit, the Gulf Cooperation Council and China endorsed the strengthening of their “existing strategic partnership”, while China became the leading trading partner for a number of Gulf states. In the same year, China announced the final Saudi–Iranian agreement reached in Beijing to restore diplomatic relations and reduce tensions.
It has perhaps become clear that relying on Washington may not serve the interests of the states of the region. US policies have already caused extensive harm to a number of countries across the area. The Gulf states made no secret of their opposition to a US war against Iran, given their understanding of the region’s realities and challenges.
Yet the Trump administration took little account of the interests of its Gulf allies, exposing the allies to greater risk. Today, the Gulf states may be better placed than any others to exert pressure on Washington to end the war, given the presence of US military bases on their territory, the burden of bearing the costs of a war that does not serve their interests, and the economic damage they would suffer from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the lifeline of their economies.
The Palestinians face their most complex challenges in the Trump era. No US administration has abandoned its deep commitment to Israel and its security, yet successive administrations have gradually retreated from their commitment to the Palestinians. Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy referred to a two-state solution that would end the occupation, while his 2015 strategy called for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy supported the possibility of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with mutually agreed land swaps. By contrast, Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy proposed an agreement that would be acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians, while his 2025 strategy described the conflict as remaining intractable, reflecting a policy that entirely disregards the Palestinians. What, then, can the Palestinians expect from the Board of Peace, the ceasefire, and all the measures introduced by Trump’s decisions affecting them?
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
